Brigham Young University Prelaw Review
Volume 22

Article 9

4-1-2008

The Evolution of U.S. Gene Patent Law: Finding the Balance
between Blatantly Obvious and Overly-Broad Gene Patents
Jad Allen Mills

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byuplr

BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Mills, Jad Allen (2008) "The Evolution of U.S. Gene Patent Law: Finding the Balance between Blatantly
Obvious and Overly-Broad Gene Patents," Brigham Young University Prelaw Review: Vol. 22 , Article 9.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byuplr/vol22/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University Prelaw Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive.
For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

The Evolution of U.S. Gene Patent Law:
Finding the Balance between Blatantly
Obvious and Overly-Broad Gene Patents
by Jad Allen Mills1

M

I. Introduction

ost anyone who has paid attention to stocks or medical journals knows that biotechnology is big business. The most
exciting biotechnology developments often include the use
of patented gene sequences. Genes encode protein structures and together they regulate how the body works. Gene patents are valuable
because they allow the owner to control gene sequences used in gene
therapies and in the testing and development of new treatments for
debilitating diseases. Many people have argued against gene patents.
Some individuals are opposed to all gene patents, while others argue
only against the way that gene patent law has evolved in the United
States. However, I maintain that the evolution of U.S. gene patent
law has developed to prevent patents that close off entire industries,
while providing a clear framework for determining whether a gene
patent is obvious or not. The non-obviousness requirement for patents
is designed to balance the interests of society and inventors by avoiding both overly-broad and blatantly obvious patents. The evolution
of gene patent law preserves this balance and allows the discoverers
of gene sequences to obtain funding and protect expected returns on
their investments of time and money, resulting in the rapid evolu-

1

Jad Allen Mills will graduate from Brigham Young University with a B.S.
in biochemistry in April 2008. He is from West Linn, Oregon. He currently lives in Provo, Utah with his wife Kristen and son Konrad. He will
begin law school in fall 2008.
59

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 22, 2008

60

tion of genetic technology. This paper first describes the controversy
that surrounded early gene patents and common objections that were
made against them. Then the development of the U.S. patent system is discussed to provide a framework to evaluate the evolution
of U.S. patent law. Finally, this evolution is evaluated in terms of
finding balance between the interests of society and intellectual
property investors.

II. Background
In 1991 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the 1987 patent of the
erythropoietin gene, which codes for a hormone used to treat patients
with kidney disease. The decision was of great financial importance
to the parties involved because the owner of the patent was making
over one billion dollars a year from the patent.2 If the patent had not
been affirmed, other companies would be allowed to compete for
this business. This major case represented the kind of returns available from biomedical research and the importance of properly protecting intellectual property. Companies and inventors began testing
the bounds of patent law by claiming increasingly broad patents with
as little information as possible. As companies made and sometimes
received broad claims of patent protection, the applications, lawsuits,
and controversy intensified.
One such case occurred in October 1992 when the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) granted patent rights to Agracetus Inc.
for rights to all forms of genetically engineered cotton, regardless
of the genes affected or the techniques used.3 Agracetus had used
one procedure to genetically alter cotton in one way and received a
patent on any kind of genetically altered cotton, no matter the process involved. In 1994 the European Patent Office (EPO) granted
Agracetus a patent on all genetically engineered soybeans plants.4
2

Eliot Marshall, Companies Rush to Patent DNA, 275 Sci., New Series,
780–81 (1997).

3

Richard Stone, Sweeping Patents Put Biotech Companies on the Warpath,
268 Sci., New Series, 656 (1995).

4

Id. at 657.
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The controversy and legal challenges erupted as people asked how
one can patent all genetically altered forms of a natural product.
They may have felt like the magician’s guild had made a lucky rabbit’s foot and was attempting to patent the whole rabbit. These broad
patent claims intensified the race by biomedical companies to submit
broader claims. The controversy reached an international furor in
1992 when a U.S. government body, the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), submitted a patent application on cDNA pieces of approximately 5 percent of all human genes.5 The broad claims would have
forced corporations to pay license fees for a patent that many argued
was unpatentable as a natural product. While the NIH controversy
was delayed and the broad claims were tied up in court, for many genetic researchers the question of the patentability of genetic material
seemed unanswered. The law, on the other hand, had been prepared
for this eventuality for some time.6
In 1980 the US Supreme Court reversed a PTO ruling denying
a patent to Ananda Chakrabarty for the first genetically engineered
organism.7 In essence Mr. Chakrabarty had created a bacterium that
could clean up oil spills. The PTO had ruled that life could not be
patented. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that, though living,
this was an artificial substance. Further judicial decisions have made
clear that even unchanged DNA sequences, once obtained from living beings, are artificial products, because these compounds do not
exist in nature in an isolated, purified state.8 As John Doll, then PTO
Biotech Section Chief explained, “Nobody owns the gene in your
body, [but] inventors can own the right to exploit it commercially;
you can’t turn over a rock and find a gene.”9 Between 1980 and 1997,
over fifteen hundred of five thousand whole gene patent applications

5

Anna Maria Gillis, The Patent Question of the Year, 42 BioSci., 336
(1992).

6

Marshall, supra note 2, at 780.

7

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980).

8

Marshall, supra note 2, at 781.

9

Id. at 781.
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were granted.10 From 1980 to 1992 the PTO awarded over 112 patents on approaches to recombinant plant DNA and on genetically
engineered plants alone.11 Despite the intense opposition of the
scientific community against patenting genes, the law was quite
clear by 1990. As one U.S. Patent Office administrator, Charles
Van Horn, put it, the furor was all about arguing over “what patent law should be, and not what it is.”12

III. Three objections to Gene Patents
Objections to the gene patents generally come in three varieties.
The first objection is that patenting a human gene is immoral. For instance, objections to the EPO patent granted to Agracetus on genetically altered soybeans were based on an obscure statute regarding
public morality.13 The suit claimed that a patent that broad created a
monopoly on a vital food supply, and that such a threat to the world
food supply was immoral. Interestingly enough, the European Parliament now claims that they prohibit gene patents because they offend morality14 and are an immoral inhibition to genetic research.15
Some may argue that gene patents are immoral because they say that
any developments derived from our genes should be shared freely
with all, and gene patents prevent this from happening. Others argue genetic research leads to increases in pollution and disease and
decreases in genetic diversity and the value of human life.16 Egypt,
India, Brazil, and the Andean Community all restrict gene patents
to some degree or another.17 Although there may be a moral basis for
10

Id. at 781.

11

Stone, supra note 3, at 656.

12

Gillis, supra note 5, at 339.

13

Stone, supra note 3, at 657.

14

Nuno Pires De Carvalho, The Problem of Gene Patents, 3 Wash. U.
Global Stud. L. Rev. 701, 709 (2004) n21

15

Id. at 706.

16

Diamond, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980).

17

De Carvalho, supra note 14, at 707–708.
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rejecting gene patents, this paper focuses instead on the legal basis
for the validity of gene patents.
The second objection to gene patents is that genes should not be
patentable because they are natural substances that exist in each of
us, and natural substances should not be patented. Hubert Curien,
then French Minister for Research and Technology, said:
A description of a short sequence of DNA or of cDNA is not
an invention. It is knowledge about a part of the natural world
that exists independently of the scientist, like the discovery
of a new star or a new physical law. If the main argument for
patenting cDNA sequences is that they are obtained thanks
to innovative procedures, then let the procedures themselves
be patented, but not the sequences established as a result of
those procedures.18
Although Curien’s argument makes a lot of sense to many people, his sentiments simply do not match up with the intent of the U.S.
Patent system.
According to the United States Code, the PTO has power to
grant patents to inventors for “any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”19 Though the naturally occurring gene as such is
not patentable, the purified and isolated form is not considered a natural substance. The European Directive on Biotechnological Inventions captures the basic legal rational for genes not being classified
as natural substances. The directive states that “biological material
which is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means
of a technical process may be [the] subject of an invention even if it
previously occurred in nature,” and even if the isolated structure is
identical to the natural one.20 This distinction is justified by the claim
that the isolated version of the gene is “the result of technical processes used to identify, purify and classify it and to reproduce it outside the human body,” techniques that nature alone has not and never
18

Gillis supra note 5, at 336; (quotes Sci. 254:1711).

19

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2007)

20

De Carvalho, supra note 14, at 718 (See De Carvalho’s notes 68 and 70).
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will produce without human intervention. The difference between
a natural substance and a manmade substance is that the manmade
substance would not exist in its useful form without the intervention
of a human; human authorship makes the substance artificial.
Some may question whether this definition makes anything a
possible object of invention. For example, although patenting a method of isolating a diamond from a rock formation may be patentable,
the diamond itself cannot be patentable because it exists naturally in
isolated form. Because nature isolates diamonds from rock formations by the natural processes of erosion, both the isolated diamond
and using natural erosion to isolate the diamond are not patentable.
However, methods for isolating the diamond may be patentable if
they isolate the diamond in some other way. Nature never isolates
genes or purifies them into forms amenable to genetic research. For
this reason genes and methods of obtaining gene are patentable subject matter. The difference comes in whether the invention would
have “spontaneously come into existence without the applicants’
exertions.”21 Natural objects and phenomena occur without the aid
of man, manipulatable genes do not.
Although this line of reasoning may not convince everyone that
genes are potentially patentable material, precedence has already
established this point of law in the United States. As I have mentioned before, the Supreme Court has already affirmed the validity
of gene patents, some worth billions of dollars. Because U.S. law and
the rule of law rely on binding legal precedence, it is not necessary
to provide a comprehensive defense of the potential patentability of
genes and genetic material.
The third common objection to gene patents is that the claims
on these patents are too broad. Thomas Kiley, former vice president and general counsel at Genentech in California described the
broad patents as an attempt to seek control of “not discoveries, but of
the means of making discoveries.”22 With broad patents obtained on
genes before the function or purpose of the gene was even known,
companies may be able to profit from or control a field of unknown
21

Gillis, supra note 5, at 338.

22

Id. at 339.
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potential. Such broad control would limit research to the handful
of large corporations that hold control of these few broad patents.
Although patents do not exclude research for academic purposes,23
funding for ventures with no hope of financial gain would be extremely limited. In addition, the broad patent rights might increase
cross-licensing cooperation among the large firms and drive smaller
companies out of the business.24 This argument seemed so compelling that a British Science Minister sought an agreement with its
researchers to not seek patents on genes of unknown utility from
research conducted using public funds.25 In 1996, Francis Collin, director of the National Center for Human Genome Research, asked
recipients of grants from his organization to release genetic data daily and not to seek patents on “raw genomic sequence” data because
of the effect this would have on future research investment.26
Whereas some countries have outright rejected gene patents on
moral and legal grounds, the U.S. patent system has attempted only
to regulate gene patents in order to prevent overly broad or unsupported patents from being issued. In 1993 the PTO rejected the NIH
application citing a lack of proven commercial utility. As Bruce Lehman, then PTO commissioner explained, “a lot of this stuff is just
data,” and data alone is not patentable.27 Because of the volume of
sequences per application and the percentage of sequences lacking
sufficient description to prove commercial utility, the PTO limited
each application to no more than ten sequences in order to force applicants to focus on real innovations. As recently as November 2007,
PTO has once again attempted to alter patent examination rules to
further regulate the issuance of patents.28 The new rules would limit
23

Id. at 337.

24

Stone, supra note 3, at 658.

25

Gillis, supra note 5, at 336.

26

Eliot Marshal, Is Data-hoarding Slowing the Assault on Pathogens, 275
Sci., New Series, 780 (1997).

27

Id. at 781.

28

Rules and Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 ( August 21, 2007) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R pt. 1).
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the number of automatic claims and continuations allowed per application. While the new rules will affect only 18 percent of all patent
applications, they will affect 85 percent of biotech patents.29
Over the years, biotechnology case law has developed to create
a balance in the types of gene patents that are considered valid. The
system seeks to prevent the issuance of overly-broad patents, without
allowing patents to be issued for obvious inventions. Our current
system resulted in part from those first broad and controversial gene
patents just discussed in this background. In order to better illustrate
the balance that has developed, I now review the basis and evolution
of the U.S. patent system as it has adapted itself to properly apply the
uniformity of the U.S. patent system to the development of genetic
technology. I then review and evaluate some criticisms of this development. In this discussion I attempt to show that the current system
is a natural outgrowth of the broad purposes of the patent system—
to promote technological development by balancing the dichotomy
between overly-broad and obvious patents.

IV. The Basis and Purpose of the Patent System
Whereas some earlier patent systems served as arbitrary reward
systems for favorites of the reigning king, the U.S. patent system
was set up deliberately as a means for promoting technological progress. In sixteenth and seventeenth century England, patents were
frequently abused by the sovereigns who would grant monopolies to
their friends for practices that had long been common knowledge.30
In contrast, Article I of the Constitution grants Congress the power
to grant exclusive ownership rights in order to “promote the Progress [sic] of Science and useful Arts.”31 The constitution allows the
federal government to grant monopolies for limited terms, but only
29

Letter from A. Scott Whitaker, Chief Operating Office, Biotechnology Industry Org., to Robert W. Bahr, Assistant Commissioner for Patents (May
2, 2006) http://www.bio.org/ip/letters/20060502.pdf.

30

Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).

31

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (See also Diamond, supra note 7, at 315 and
Graham, supra note 30, at 5).
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for “innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of
useful knowledge.”32 This power was applied broadly from the very
beginning. The Patent Act of 1793 described what could be patented
as “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof].”33 Thomas
Jefferson, the author of the 1793 patent legislation and one of the first
patent commissioners stated that “certainly an inventor ought to be
allowed a right to the benefit of his invention for some certain time.
. . . Nobody wishes more than I do that ingenuity should receive a
liberal encouragement.”34
Patents exist to help address the economic problems of free-riders. People who create advances in technology are unlikely to share
information with others because they will then lose their effective
advantage gained by discovering the invention. However, if society
will enforce their ownership of that information, the chances of disclosure increase. With increased disclosure, technological advances
can take place more quickly as others can build upon the original
advance. Thus the U.S. patent system is designed to encourage capital and intellectual investment in innovation by rewarding those who
successfully invest by giving them a temporary monopoly. This encouragement comes at a price, as the monopolist will raise prices
in the absence of competition. In order to reduce the cost of patents to the free market, patent systems seek to balance patent
breadth by allowing neither “sweeping” patents nor patents of
obvious innovations.
Inventors seek to construe the claimed invention to be as wide in
applicability as possible in order to increase the market value of their
patent. However, a sweeping patent may “foreclose entire portions of
developing technologies in exchange for either insufficient or already
available information,” thereby accomplishing an inefficient transfer

32

Graham, supra note 30 at 6.

33

Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (See Diamond, supra note 7,
at 314).

34

Letter to Oliver Evans (May 1807), V Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at
75–76 (Washington ed.); quoted in Graham, supra note 30, at 8.
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of wealth.35 If, however, patent scope is limited to avoid granting
only a few, sweeping patents, a large number of limited patents may
be granted, some of which may be obvious considering prior inventions. Thus, patent granting is a balancing act between allowing the
overly broad, and allowing the blatantly obvious.

V. Patent Eligibility Criteria
A. Novelty and Utility
Statutory subject matter, as described in the response to objection two, must also be novel, non-obvious, and useful in order to be
patentable.36 If any one of these three conditions is not met a patent
cannot be granted.
To be novel an invention must not have been published or used
anywhere in the world more than a year prior to the application for
the patent. To have utility the invention must have at least one known
credible and specific application. Utility also requires that the invention be enabled. Enablement includes providing a description of
the preferred embodiment of the invention that contains sufficient
description that an individual skilled in the technology (called an
art) would be able to make and use the invention as intended without
excessive experimentation.37 If the description does not adequately
explain the use of the claimed invention, then the standards of enablement and utility are not met and that invention cannot be patented. Meeting standards of utility and novelty have been requirements
for receiving a patent since the U.S. patent statute of 1793.38 More

35

Anita Varma and David Abraham, Dna is Different: Legal Obviousness
and the Balance Between Biotech Inventors and the Market, 9 Harv. J.
Law & Tec. 53, 55 (1996).

36

35 U.S.C. § 101, 102, 103 (2007).

37

John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 Sci., New Series, 690 (1998).

38

Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (See Diamond, supra note 7,
at 314).
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recent cases have helped to elucidate the meaning of these requirements for gene patents.
In 1966, the US Supreme Court ruled in Brenner v. Manson that
chemical inventions must be coupled with a likely and useful application in order to be patentable.39 The court stated that “unless and
until . . . specific benefit exists in currently available form—there is
insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what
may prove to be a broad field.”40 However, the requirement of having
utility does not mean that a patent must describe a completely optimized embodiment of the invention. In the 1980 8th Circuit case of
E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co.,41 the court found
that “an invention does not lack utility merely because the particular embodiment disclosed in the patent lacks perfection or performs
crudely. . . . A commercially successful product is not required.”42
In addition, not all possible uses must be known. The requirement
is fulfilled if sufficient evidence is provided that the invention is potentially useful. The U.S. standard requires only a small threshold
for proving utility. For example, U.S. patent law allows patents to be
granted on protein or cDNA sequences even if the protein function is
not yet known because the sequence has possible uses by itself, such
as acting as a probe for karyotyping.43 In contrast, in Great Britain,
patent protection cannot be obtained unless the invention comprises
an immediate industrial application.
B. Obviousness
In the first sixty years of U.S. patent law, commissioners and
judges evaluated patent applications with the two defined parameters
of novelty and utility, but also with a very vague requirement that it
must describe an invention. In 1851 the Supreme Court formulated
39

Gillis, supra note 5, at 338–339.

40

Brenner v. Manson 383 U.S., 519, 535 (1966).

41

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 1247,
1257 (8th Cir. 1980).

42

Gillis, supra note 5, at 338.

43

Id.
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a guideline for determining whether a claim truly constituted an invention. In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court invalidated a patent
by introducing the requirement of non-obviousness. The Court held
that an invention requires a contribution to the specific field of the
innovation that would not be obvious to a practitioner of common
skill in that particular field.44 “Unless more ingenuity and skill . .
. were required . . . than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree
of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every
invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of a skillful
mechanic, not that of the inventor.”45 In Hotchkiss, the court tried
to clarify a more specific parameter for determining whether some
development is really an invention by introducing the requirement
of non-obviousness. In so doing, the court also tied the non-obviousness threshold to the level of common skill in each particular
art (field of invention).46 In addition to making patent law industry
specific, the requirement of non-obviousness also placed the patent
system in a delicate balancing act. If obviousness depends on the
level of expertise of the art’s common practitioner, fields with a low
perceived threshold of skill in the art might be tempted to allow
overly broad patents. On the other hand, in an attempt to avoid
allowing patents of an overly sweeping scope, the patent office
might allow a multitude of seemingly obvious patents.
In 1952, Congress incorporated and codified the requirement
of non-obviousness into the 1952 Patent Act.47 In Graham v. John
Deere, the Supreme Court set out to determine whether the Patent
Act of 1952 changed the statutory and judicial tests of patentability.48 They concluded that the act merely included the judicial test
described in the Hotchkiss v. Greenwood decision of 1851, and that
“the general level of innovation necessary to sustain patentability
44

Graham, 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).

45

Id (quotes Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248, 268 (1851)).

46

Graham, supra note 44, at 14.

47

Id. at 3–5.

48

Id.
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remains the same” as before the 1952 Patent Act.49 In Graham, the
court identified four parts to an obviousness inquiry.50 The inquiry
includes first determining the scope and content of the prior art, and
second determining the difference between the claimed invention
and the prior art. Thirdly, the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent
art must be identified, after which the fourth step of considering any
secondary indications of non-obviousness may be undertaken. Secondary indications may include commercial success or a long-felt
need in the art.51 After completing these four steps, an innovation is determined to be obvious “[i]f the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as
a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”52 It is this standard that has been applied over the past
fifty years to balance the intellectual property rights of the inventor
with the needs of the market, all the while tailoring the inquiry to the
current state of the particular art by tying obviousness to the level of
skill of an average practitioner in that particular art.
C. Prima Facie Obviousness
Although this four-step plan seems simple enough, it becomes
much more complex when one considers the incredible amount of
prior art that has been accumulating over the last two centuries. In
order to deal with this difficulty, procedures for determining prima
facie obviousness have been developed. Patent applications are presumed patentable when filed with the PTO.53 If the examiner can
build a case of prima facie obviousness, the applicant must then pres49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Varma, supra note 35, at 66 (See also Varma’s notes 61 and 62, and Graham, supra note 30 at 17–18).

52

Id. at 65 (See Varma’s note 59).

53

See In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and In re Oetiker,
977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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ent evidence to overcome the prima facie rejection.54 One proposed
method for establishing a prima facie case of obviousness includes
using the “suggestion test.” The suggestion test asks whether teachings in the prior art “would appear to have suggested the claimed
subject matter to a person of ordinary skill in the art.”55
Gene patents frequently claim methods of obtaining and using
genes as well as actual structures (nucleotide sequences) of genes.
When a gene structure (sequence) is claimed, the doctrine of structural similarity is generally applied to determine obviousness. The
doctrine of structural similarity existed before the 1952 Patent Act
and was reaffirmed in the Federal Circuit case of In re Dillon.56 Since
chemical function corresponds with structure, compounds with the
same chemical structure are assumed to have similar functions.
DNA and RNA are merely large, complex chemical compounds. As
such, they have traditionally been evaluated by means of the structural similarity test.
In re Bell teaches that when a specific gene is claimed as a composition by detailing the sequence, only prior disclosure of that sequence or other sequences with an intrinsic motivation to convert it
to the claimed sequence can be used to determine obviousness. The
PTO initially rejected Bell’s patent because the primary sequence of
the protein was known, as were methods of obtaining the DNA sequence.57 The court ruled that “the PTO’s focus on Bell’s method is
misplaced. Bell does not claim a method. Bell claims compositions,
and the issue is the obviousness of the claimed compositions, not of
the method by which they are made.”58 This position was reaffirmed
in Deuel.59
Although a method of obtaining the correct gene sequence may
be obvious, this does not make the gene sequence itself obvious, and
54

Varma, supra note 35, at 66–67.

55

Id. at 67 and 79.

56

Id. at 67.

57

In re Bell 991 F.2d 781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

58

Id. at 785.

59

In re Deuel 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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thus allows the gene sequence to be patented.60 Given that Deuel
claimed a new chemical entity in structural terms, prima facie obviousness would require that the prior art suggest the claimed structure, not simply how to obtain the structure.61 The court defined the
issue in Bell and Deuel not as a matter of the uncertainty in obtaining a particular sequence, but in the uncertainty of predicting or visualizing from the prior art what sequence would be found.62
The courts also dismissed the idea that the translational relationship between proteins and DNA makes the DNA sequence obvious
based on the known protein sequence, “because the redundancy of
the genetic code permits one to hypothesize an enormous number
of DNA sequences coding for the protein. No particular DNA sequence can be obvious unless there is something in the prior art to
lead to that particular DNA sequence and indicate that it should be
prepared.63 The actual structure of the sought gene sequence is almost never obvious in light of the protein sequence because the degeneracy of the genetic code allows multiple gene sequences to code
for the same amino acid.
D. Actual Sequences Required to Define and Describe Genes
In addition to defining the nonobviousness threshold for genetic
inventions, the structural similarity test also impacts the standard
required to define the invention. The courts have long held that an
actual gene sequence is required as part of a composition claim for
a gene. In Fiers v. Revel, the court held that disclosing a method for
isolating DNA that would enable an ordinary practitioner to have a
reasonable chance of success in obtaining the DNA does not establish conception of the DNA sequence, and therefore cannot consti-

60

Id. at 1557–1558. See also Bell, supra note 56 at 784–785, and In re
Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

61

Id. at 1557–1558.

62

Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific, 17
Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1155, 1179 (2002).

63

Deuel, supra note 59, 1558–1559.

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 22, 2008

74

tute a claim on the DNA itself.64 Furthermore, the court held that it
is “not sufficient to define it [the gene] solely by its principal biological property, e.g., encoding human erythropoietin [protein], because
an alleged conception having no more specificity than that is simply a wish to know the identity of any material with that biological
property.”65 The court further explained that “when an inventor is
unable to envision the detailed chemical structure of the gene so as to
distinguish it from other materials, as well as a method for obtaining
it, conception has not been achieved until reduction to practice has
occurred, i.e., until after the gene has been isolated.”66 “Irrespective
of the complexity or simplicity of the method of isolation employed,
conception of a DNA, like conception of any chemical substance,
requires a definition of that substance other than by its functional
utility.”67 A definition by function only defines what the gene does
and not what it is.68 “Conception of a substance claimed per se without reference to a process requires conception of its structure, name,
formula, or definitive chemical or physical properties.”69
The actual sequence is required not only as proof of conception
of the invention, but also to provide an adequate description of the
invention.70 “A bare reference to a DNA with a statement that it can
be obtained by reverse transcription is not a description; it does not
indicate that [the inventor is] in possession of the DNA.”71 This idea
was confirmed in another case, the Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly.72 The court found that the specifics required for a
competent description of DNA requires describing the “structure,
64

Fiers v. Revel 984 F.2d 1164, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

65

Id. at 1169.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Burk, supra note 62, at 1176.

69

Fiers, supra note 64, at 1169.

70

Burk, supra note 62, at 1175.

71

Id. at 1175 (See Burk’s note 81).

72

Id. (See Burk’s note 84).
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formula, chemical name, or physical properties.”73 A description requires more than just saying that the gene is part of the invention
because one has part of the gene and a potential method for isolating
the entire gene.74
Each of these cases has refined biotechnology patent law to a position in which genes are not obvious based on the proteins they code
for, and in which the sequence of that gene is required both to define
and to describe the invention itself. According to one commentator:
The conceptual linkage of obviousness and enablement to
the depiction of macromolecular sequences in, respectively,
the prior art or the patent disclosure, dictates a particular
and predictable result for the availability and scope of such
biotechnology patents. The expected outcome is that DNA
patents will be numerous but extremely narrow. Under the
Federal Circuit’s precedent, a researcher will be able to
claim only sequences disclosed under the stringent written
description rules—the actual sequence in hand, so to speak.
. . . At the same time, the inventor is shielded from obviousness by the lack of such explicit and detailed disclosure in
the prior art. This lack of effective prior art seems to dictate
that anyone who has isolated and characterized a novel DNA
molecule is certain to receive a patent on it. But the inventor
is certain to receive a patent only on that molecule, as the
Federal Circuit appears to regard other related molecules as
inadequately described until the sequence is disclosed.75

VI. Attacking the Evolution of Gene Patent Law
According to Varma and Abraham, this state of affairs in biotechnology patent law has upset the balance between protecting the
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interests of patent applicants and the interests of society.76 Varma
and Abraham argue that this occurred because court decisions have
improperly applied the structural relationship test of obviousness to
DNA,77 improperly rejected general process disclosures from questions of obviousness of compositions,78 and improperly applied the
doctrine of selection inventions.79 They argue that the structural relationship test does not work appropriately with DNA because the
value of DNA is in its correlative relationship to protein structures,
and not in its own structure.80 Because seemingly minute changes in
a DNA structure can cause enormous and unanticipated changes in
protein structure, they claim that the structural relationship test is
insufficient to determine obviousness of DNA sequences. This has
led to an imbalance in favor of applicants seeking to patent gene
sequences, as almost any gene sequence turns out to be patentable.
Varma and Abraham cite the case of Deforest Radio v. General Electric81 to show that general processes have been used as prior art to
invalidate compositions. Regarding the doctrine of selection inventions, they argue that is was inappropriately used in Bell and Deuel
because the breadth of choices should be considered relative to the
practitioner of average skill in the art, and not in absolute numbers.82
They urge use of the suggestion test instead of the structural similarity test and show that doing so will make most, if not all new gene
patents, obvious in the current state of the art.

VII. Defending the Evolution of Gene Patent Law
In response to Varma and Abraham, I argue that their use of the
suggestion test enforces a much higher standard of invention than
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was envisioned by the statute or constitution, and I contend that their
use of Deforest is ill founded. In Deforest, the prior art disclosed the
exact same structure for the exact same use.83 A vacuum tube was
described and claimed and it was suggested that a higher vacuum in
the tube would be beneficial. A method for creating a higher vacuum
was also described. The later patent that was invalidated merely disclosed the same vacuum tube from the prior art with the greater vacuum that had been suggested and enabled in the prior art patent.84
Although anyone with a Ph.D. in a relevant field, given the proper time and funding can reasonably expect to isolate a gene sequence
given the protein sequence, this still constitutes a real and important
advance in available technology. Because a substantial investment is
still required to obtain the invention and because the prior art cannot predict the exact nature of the invention, newly sequenced genes
are not obvious. The reason gene sequences are so unpredictable
from protein sequences lies not in the field of genetic technology,
but in thermodynamics. Science’s current understanding of the laws
of thermodynamics has proven insufficient to accurately predict the
effects of pinpoint gene mutations in final protein structures.85 Because of this lack of comprehension, practitioners are almost entirely
at a loss to accurately predict gene structure from protein structure.
Making a completely unknown structure obvious simply because it
is known to exist and methods of finding it can be postulated significantly increases the inventive standard envisioned by the drafters of
both the original and subsequent patent acts. Doing so may be akin
to ruling all inventions of any kind obvious because someone can
envision a method of creating an invention.
To illustrate this point, I describe a generic method of creating
an invention with four steps. Step 1: Determine an area of production
or industry facing some sort of problem or inefficiency. Step 2: Design a novel way to address that problem or inefficiency. Step 3: Enable the method. Step 4: Apply for a patent on the method. Although
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it may seem absurd that this method could make any invention obvious because the method is so generic, if followed by a practitioner
of average skill in an art, that practitioner has a reasonable chance
of arriving at a solution. The reason this method does not make that
solution obvious is the same reason that DNA probing techniques
do not make DNA sequence obvious: the methods give little or no
information about the product being sought. My method cannot define nor describe the invention being sought, but if followed with
diligence it will almost certainly yield a productive result.
There is a clear corollary in biotechnology that illustrates the
absurd consequences of allowing generic methods of discovery to
obviate particular inventions. Vaccines have been developed and
used for years. Any immunologist can testify that there are tried and
true methods of obtaining a vaccine for a normal pathogen. I say
normal here, because some diseases, such as HIV, adapt so quickly
that normal methods of vaccine development are not effective. The
method includes identifying a pathogen-born disease to which one
desires to develop a vaccine. One may then isolate weakened or dead
samples of the pathogen and inject them into a healthy immune system. The immune system develops antibodies to the pathogen, and
the researcher isolates, purifies, and mass produces the antibodies
in a vaccine to administer to others. Despite the fact that the average practitioner in the art has a reasonable expectation of success in
developing the antibody, the specific antibody, the doses required,
and the ideal medium for administration, are unknown. Knowing
a generic method of finding the desired product contributes little to
our conception of the final product. Individuals must still go through
the sometimes tedious process of invention and development, even
knowing that they have a method that gives a reasonable probability
of success.
The vaccine example also connects well with gene patents for
a second reason. Both genes and antibodies are naturally occurring
materials that become patentable compositions when they are isolated from their natural state and purified into a form that allows for
their manipulation. Whereas two hundred years ago most inventions
were merely the adaptation of naturally occurring minerals or fibers
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for the use of mankind, genes and antibody inventions adapt naturally occurring micro-objects for the use of mankind. Traditionally,
inventors made machines to transform a natural element into a manmade product; naturally occurring iron ore may be put into a smelter
and processed to create steel. Some may find it distasteful to use a
living thing, especially a human body, as part of a machine to transform the natural into the manmade. However, all of our machines are
merely natural objects combined or adapted for the use we design for
them. The fact that we have used a living organism, even a human, to
develop a transferable immunity that would not otherwise naturally
occur, is probably much more beautiful than it is scary. Along with
genes, the antibody that is developed and isolated may be exactly
like the one that may exist naturally in each of us. However, such antibodies do not tend to naturally jump from one person to immunize
an entire population. Similarly, naturally occurring genes very infrequently pop out of people’s bodies naturally in a condition where
they can be manipulated by mankind. Even if the isolated antibody
can be proven to be exactly like one naturally existing in our bodies,
and even if the method used to obtain it could have been predicted
to be successful by most immunologists out there, is there not still
an inventive spark in developing that new vaccine? The presence of
a pathogenic disease and a method of obtaining a vaccine against it
certainly does not predict for us the specifics of that vaccine or the
antibody within it. Then, certainly the existence of a protein and a
method of obtaining a genetic sequence for it does not make the specifics of the gene obvious.
So far as fears that patents will have an adverse effect on research and biomedical progress, such has been the fear from the beginning of intellectual property protection in the 1790s. The same
arguments were used forty years ago when polymer chemistry was
introduced.86 Critics claimed that patents granted on synthetic polymer products and processes would devastate the market. The truth
was that the first polymer patent in 1965 did not prevent later patents
of related inventions. Similarly, polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
and HIV Protease patents did not hinder biotechnology research,
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but rather encouraged innovations based on the original patent.87
That is the purpose of patents, to encourage investment and the
dissemination of technology by ensuring the protection of intellectual property.

VIII. Conclusion
Though some will continue to question the morality of patenting a gene sequence derived from a living organism and especially
from a human being, the fact is that as a matter of law, genes are
patentable materials in the U.S. I began this paper by discussing the
fear and controversy surrounding those first, broad gene patents. I
then presented the basics of patent law and the evolution of gene
patents that are defined specifically and narrowly by specific gene
sequences. Next, I reviewed the argument from Varma and Abraham
that this evolution has led us down a mistaken path and damaged
the economic balance of the patent system. These objections, though
interesting, are unconvincing. The non-obviousness requirement of
patents is designed to balance the interests of society and inventors
by finding the right path between granting sweeping, overly-broad
patents, and allowing patents on the blatantly obvious. The current
evolution of gene patents has struck that balance, allaying the fears
about patenting entire industries with insufficient information while
providing a clear framework for determining whether a gene patent is obvious or not. This framework allows discoverers of gene
sequences to obtain funding and protect expected returns on their
investments of time and money. Without patent protection, perhaps
we would not have all of the gene sequences today that we do. The
evolution of gene patent law, in light of the non-obviousness requirement, has preserved the careful balance between granting a few
overly broad patents and granting many narrow patents that, if upset,
may have inhibited financial investment and new discoveries.
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